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RECENT DECISIONS
ADMIRALTY-WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTES-USE OF STATE LAw-Petitioner's decedent, a carpenter, was employed by a contractor hired to repair
the Bonneville Dam, which is owned and operated by the United States.
During the course of his employment, decedent was drowned when the boat
he was in capsized in the water below the dam. Petitioner sued the United
States in federal district court under the Federal Tort Claims Act,1 alleging
that the accident was caused by the negligence of employees of the United
States who were operating the dam. The claim was based on the Oregon
Wrongful Death Statute2 and on the Oregon Employer's Liability Law,
which, in certain circumstances, permits recovery for death if defendant
employer did not "use every device, care and precaution which it is
practicable to use for the protection and safety of life and limb."3 The
district court held there was no negligence, and therefore no liability under
the Wrongful Death Statute, and that the Employer's Liability Law did
not apply because the use of the high standard of care established by the law
would be unconstitutional. The court of appeals affirmed on the ground
that there had not been any negligence and that the Employer's Liability
Law "could not be constitutionally applied to this case."4 On certiorari to
the Supreme Court of the United States, held, reversed and remanded, two
justices dissenting.I> When courts applying maritime law adopt state wrongful death statutes, state substantive law is followed, even when the state
standard of care is higher than the duty imposed by maritime law. Hess v.
United States, 361 U.S. 314 (1960).
The Supreme Court in The Harrisburg, 6 which overruled a number of
lower court decisions,7 held that general maritime law gave no action for
wrongful death, but indicated such actions would be allowed in admiralty
if based upon statute.8 Subsequent cases approved the use of state wrongful death statutes, where applicable, to escape the harsh general maritime
law doctrine.9 Federal legislation providing remedies for wrongful death
has diminished the need for applying state statutes,1° but they are still used
128 u.s.c. (1958) §§1346 (b), 2674.
Ore. Rev. Stat. (1953) §30.020.
3 Ore. Rev. Stat. (1953) §§654.305-654.335.
4 Hess v. United States, (9th Cir. 1958) 259 F. (2d) 285 at 292, cert. granted 359 U.S.
923 (1959).
5 Justices Harlan and Frankfurter. See note 20 infra.
6119 U.S. 199 (1886).
7 The Sea Gull, (C.C. Md. 1865) 21 Fed. Cas. 909 at 910, No. 12,578. See Cutting v.
Seabury, (D.C. Mass. 1860) 6 Fed. Cas. 1083 at 1084, No. 3521 (dictum).
s The Harrisburg, note 6 supra, at 213.
9 E.g., Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 at 242 (1921); The Hamilton, 207 U.S.
398 at 406 (1907).
10 The Death on the High Seas Act, 41 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U .S.C. (1958) §761 provides
a remedy for wrongful death but only if it occurs more than one marine league from
shore; The Merchant Marine Act of 1920 Gones Act), 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. (1958)
§688 allows a recovery for the wrongful death only if the decedent was a "seaman" in the
course of his employment.
2
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in areas where federal law does not apply. Courts applying state wrongful
death statutes have generally assumed that they create a new right of action
for the maritime tort, a right rooted in state rather than maritime law,11
and that in these instances state substantive law controls. This assumption
was recently confirmed in The Tungus v. Skovgaard,12 where the Court
held that a state wrongful death statute13 could give a remedy based on
unseaworthiness only if the state statute was interpreted, as a matter of
state law, to embrace such a claim. The statute there involved was so
construed, although it imposed a duty of care in terms of ordinary common
law negligence.1 4 The principal case follows The Tungus doctrine by requiring the application of state substantive law. However, unlike the situation in The Tungus, the duty of care imposed by the state law in the
principal case was higher than that found in maritime law and, to this
ex.tent, the principal case represents an extension of that doctrine. In decisions prior to The Tungus, a minority of -courts interpreted state wrongful death statutes to provide only a remedy,15 and applied maritime
substantive law under these statutes. This interpretation rested largely on
the ground that the duty of care imposed by maritime law was a traditional
maritime right, of which a person could not be deprived. This view was
rejected in- The Tungus in favor of the application of state substantive law.
However, upon comparison with The Tungus doctrine and its inherent
difficulties, it would seem that th~ rejected view is supported by the more
persuasive reasoning. Courts following the reasoning in both The Tungus
;ind the principal case would appear to be required to apply the state
standard of care regardless of whether it imposes a greater or lesser duty
than that imposed by maritime law.16 The application of a lower state
standard of care was avoided in The Tungus by interpreting the state
wrongful death statute to incorporate the higher maritime standard of
care.11 Other courts, however, have refused to use this fiction of incorpora11 The H.S., Inc., No. 72, (3d Cir. 1942) 130 F. (2d) 341 at 343; K.lingseisen v. Costanzo
Transportation Co., (3d Cir. 1939) 101 F. (2d) 902 at 903. See Pym v. The Great Northern
Ry. Co., 4 B. &: S. 396, 122 Eng. Rep. 509 (1863).
12 358 U.S. 588 (1959).
13 N.J. Stat. Ann. (1952) §2A:31-1.
14 The New Jersey act was patterned after the original Lord Campbell's Act, 9 &: 10
Viet., C. 93 (1846).
15 O'Leary v. United States Lines Co., (1st Cir. 1954) 215 F. (2d) 708 at 711 (dictum);
Pope&: Talbot v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 at 409 (1953) (dictum); Riley v. Agwilines, Inc., 296
N.Y. 402 at 405, 73 N.E. (2d) 718 (1947). See also Wardner, "Enforcement of a Right of
Action Acquired Under Foreign Law for Death Upon the High Seas," 21 HAR.v. L. REv.
75 at 79 (1907). For discussion of the meaning of the dictum in Pope &: Talbot v. Hawn,
see Kolius and Cecil, "Maritime Torts Resulting in Death in State Territorial Waters: The
Skovgaard and Halecki Cases," 26 INS. COUNSEL J. 567 at 579 (1959); note, 34 TULANE L.
REv. 181 at 182 (1959).
16 See Babin v. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., (La. App. 1957) 94 S. (2d) 715 at 716
(1957); Graham v. Lusi, (5th Cir. 1953) 206 F. (2d) 223 at 225. But see note 20 infra.
17 In The Tungus v. Skovgaard, note 12 supra, the Supreme Court accepted the court
of appeals' interpretation of the New Jersey wrongful death statute. See note, 45 VA. L.
REv. 1222 at 1223 (1959); Kolius and Cecil, "Maritime Torts Resulting in Death in State
Territorial Waters: The Skovgaard and Halecki Cases," 26 INS. COUNSEL J. 567 (1959).
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tion because it cannot be justified by the language in the wrongful death
statute.18 The problem of avoiding the application of a lower state standard
of care would never arise if the view rejected in The Tungus were used by
the courts. Under such a view, maritime law would be applied in every
case and the normally higher duty of care19 imposed by this law would
result in greater protection for the individual. Only in rare instances, as
the principal case where the state statute requires an abnormally high
standard of care, would there be an exception.20
Moreover, the use of state wrongful death statutes substantively has
created an indefensible anomaly in the law.21 In an area where state
wrongful death statutes are used, recovery may tum on whether or not the
injury is fatal. If fatal, state law applies, for the action will arise under the
wrongful death statute; while if non-fatal, maritime law controls, since it
affords a tort remedy. 22 The ludicrousness of this situation is magnified
when a wrongful death action and survival action are brought based on the
same accident. For example, assume the decedent has been contributorily
negligent. Since a state survival statute supplies only the remedy,2 3 maritime law with its comparative negligence rule applies, and there might still
be a recovery. However, since a wrongful death.statute creates a new right
under state substantive law, contributory negligence would be an absolute
bar to any recovery.24 This anomaly can also be avoided by following the
view rejected in The Tungus, as in all situations the substantive maritime
law would control. Finally, it should be noted that the use of the different
substantive law of each state under the view in the principal case may, in
certain situations, violate the constitutional requirement of uniformity in
maritime law.25 The Court in the principal case recognized this danger by
leaving"... open the question whether a state wrongful death action might
contain provisions so offensive to traditional principles of maritime law
18 E.g.,
19 The

Graham v. Lusi, note 16 supra, at 225.
Max Morris, 137 U.S. 1 at 8 (1890) (comparative negligence in maritime law);
The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110 at 122 (1936) (admiralty does not recognize assumption of risk as a bar to recovery); Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 at 105 (1944)
(unseaworthiness doctrine puts an absolute duty on owner to supply a seaworthy ship).
One reason for the greater protection of maritime law is its traditional ability to do what
is "fair and just": The Sea Gull, note 7 supra, at 910; Pope 8e Talbot v. Hawn, note 15
supra, at 409. See Hough, "Admiralty Jurisdiction - Of Late Years," 37 HAR.v. L. REv.
529 at 529 (1924).
20 In the principal case Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Frankfurter, dissented on the
ground that the federal supremacy principle is violated when the states create a higher
standard of duty than maritime law would require. Under this view it would be correct
to apply state law as long as it affords no greater protection than maritime law. This
result appears contrary to the traditional policies of admiralty discussed in note 19 supra.
21 But see O'Leary v. United States Lines, note 15 supra, at 714 (dissent).
22 Graham v. Lusi, note 16 supra, at 225.
23 Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383 at 392 (1940).
24 Byrd v. Napoleon Ave. Ferry Co., (E.D. La. 1954) 125 F. Supp. 573 at 578, affd. per
curiam (5th Cir. 1955) 227 F. (2d) 958, cert. den. 351 U.S. 925 (1956).
25 Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917) established the uniformity doctrine but said state wrongful death statutes were an exception. The Jensen doctrine is
discussed in GILMORE AND BLACK, ADMIRALTY 333 et seq. (1957).
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that the admiralty would decline to enforce them."2 6 Under the view that
state wrongful death statutes furnish only a remedy to enforce maritime
substantive law, there would be no interference with the uniformity doctrine. One solution to the foregoing difficulties is simply to adopt the
"remedy" view of state wrongful death statutes, overruling The Tungus and
all cases based on it, including the principal case.27 However, the obvious,
and perhaps ultimately necessary, alternative solution is congressional
legislation extending a wrongful death action to all situations where maritime law is applied, thus avoiding the problems created by the adoption of
state statutes. Although Congress has been reluctant to act in this area in
the past, the decision in the principal case may well provide sufficient impetus for the needed legislation.
Louis Frey

26 Principal
27 It should

case at 320.
be noted that three justices in the majority of The Tungus decision are
in the dissent in the principal case, and four justices join in the opinion of the Court in
the principal case solely because of The Tungus, but reserve the right to overrule it;
thus only two justices are in favor of this line of reasoning. Moreover, it has been suggested
that The Harrisburg be overruled as the Court based its decision on English law which
has since allowed a wrongful death action in maritime cases. 23 HALsnURY's LAws OF
ENGLAND, 2d ed., §979 (1936). Some writers have suggested the wrongful death action is
today part of our general law and not merely statutory. See note, 13 N.A.C.C.A. L.J 186
at 189 (1954); Wardner, "Enforcement of a Right of Action Acquired Under Foreign Law

